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Reviewed by Ronald Rotunda
If you want to understand your own language, learn a foreign tongue.
Similarly, if you want to understand the American system of government, learn
what our intellectual kin—Great Britain and Canada—have done. As Professor
F.H. Buckley notes, “He who knows only his own country knows little enough
of that.”1 He is one of the few people who has thoroughly mastered the legal
structure and history of all three countries.
When it comes to comparative law and comparative politics, it would
be hard to ﬁnd a more qualiﬁed or better-trained guide for the perplexed.
Buckley holds a chaired professorship at George Mason University School of
Law, in Virginia.2 He has also taught at Panthéon-Assas University, Sciences
Po in Paris, the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, the McGill Faculty of
Law in Montreal, and the University of Chicago.3 He also practiced law for
three years in Toronto.4 His ﬁrst law degree is Canadian (McGill University)
and the second, American (Harvard).5
His latest book6 is The Once and Future King: The Rise of Crown Government in
America. By crown government, he means rule by a powerful central executive.
At the time of our independence, the monarch, George III, was that ﬁgure.
Now, the president of the United States is becoming that ﬁgure. He is Rex
Quondam, Rex Futurus—the once and future king.
Ronald Rotunda is the Doy & Dee Henley Chair and Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence,
Chapman University, Dale E. Fowler School of Law.
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Our Constitution is the oldest written constitution in the world,7 yet that
Constitution of 1787 is not the same today as it was over two centuries ago.
Professor Buckley argues that we have gone through four constitutional
stages, not only because of Supreme Court decisions but also because of the
original decision of the framers to reject a parliamentary form of government.
The framers were worried that Congress was the most dangerous of the three
branches of government,8 so it sought to separate executive powers from
the legislature so that the chief executive would be an important check on
legislative abuse. Now, the greater risk of abuse lies with executive power.
We have moved from the presidency that the framers envisioned to the type
of government they had rejected—virtual crown government. Buckley argues
that parliamentary government is a better protection for our liberties. To
substantiate his position, he takes us on a fascinating historical tour, starting
with George III and the Constitutional Convention, and ending with the
modern presidency under Bill Clinton, George Bush, and Barack Obama. It
is a carefully written and thoroughly researched work (the endnotes comprise
64 pages of this 385-page book).
Along the way, we learn that the framers came much closer than we know
to creating a parliamentary system. In fact, they thought that they had created
a quasi-parliamentary system. The House of Representatives, the framers
thought, would really choose the president because the presidential electors
would not agree. While the prime minister can choose to call a new election
and face the voters when he thinks it is propitious, the American president
would have a ﬁxed term and must face reappointment every four years.
However, what the framers envisioned is not what we have today.
Since 1787—and particularly in the past quarter-century—many countries
have adopted written constitutions. And many of them have chosen the
presidential system. Unfortunately, those countries that have adopted the
presidential system have tended to be unfriendly to civil liberties as compared
with countries that have adopted the parliamentary system. His book proves
that point with analysis and also with statistics. Look at the countries around
the world, and it is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd a president for life. It is harder to ﬁnd
a prime minister for life.
Buckley argues that presidential systems are more likely to enter a war.
Presidential systems, as compared with parliamentary systems, have a 50
percent increase in military budgets.9 (His appendices explain in detail his
methodology.) It is easier to enter a war if the country already has a strong
military and a president who does not need parliamentary approval.
America has been an exception. It is one of the freest countries in the world.
Routinely we are told that America is “exceptional.” Polls show that we owe
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this to the framers and our Constitution. Buckley’s response: “While that’s a
nice story, it lacks the added advantage of accuracy.”10 He contends that it is
not our presidential system that made the diﬀerence: America is exceptional
because it has remained free while remaining presidential.
Many of us (I included) favor the system we have lived in all our lives.
Buckley favors the parliamentary system. Given his Canadian background,
that is not surprising. Yet Buckley does not prefer the parliamentary system
because of nostalgia. He has reasons, and this book is his justiﬁcation. It is
indeed a powerful justiﬁcation. Even if this book does not persuade you, it
is still worth your while to read it so that you see if what you believe merely
reﬂects the fact that you were born in the United States.
Buckley explains that the United States has lived under four constitutions.
The ﬁrst was what the Colonies experienced, with crown government and rule
from Britain, followed by the Articles of Confederation. The second was the
Constitution of 1787, created to correct the problems under the Articles. It
was closest to the parliamentary system, with a powerful Congress. The third
Constitution came with the presidency of Andrew Jackson. Congress held the
legislative power, but the president’s role expanded. In that era, the protection
of the separation of powers continued but the president became more powerful:
We moved into the age of popular democracy with the president in charge, the
head of state and the head of government.
The fourth Constitution is the one under which we now live. In practice,
it gives the president many of the powers of a constitutional monarch. The
media have transformed the president into a “rock star.”11 He alone has the
moral authority of being elected by the entire country. He creates most of the
law when his appointees issue regulations, and he unmakes federal statutes
by refusing to enforce them. He can begin a war without a declaration of war.
He becomes more powerful because there is only one chief executive while
there are hundreds of members of Congress. Thus, any bargaining between
the president and Congress starts with the members ﬁrst negotiating among
themselves, on the House or Senate ﬂoor, and in the press. How and why the
fourth Constitution developed is the essence of this book.
Most of us are familiar with the Constitutional Convention, yet Buckley’s
discussion and analysis of that convention adds a new dimension. He shows
that the framers came much closer to a parliamentary government than many
of us realized. The delegates debated the method of selecting the president
on twenty-one diﬀerent days, taking more than thirty diﬀerent votes on the
subject. In sixteen of these, they voted on the method of selecting the president,
and in six roll call votes (once unanimously) they decided that Congress
should appoint the president. Once they voted in favor of the state legislatures
appointing the president. Every time the delegates voted on whether the
people should elect the president, they voted no. All of these votes show that
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the delegates favored a system closer to the parliamentary system, where the
House of Commons appoints the prime minister. The major diﬀerence is that
the president, unlike the prime minister, would have a ﬁxed term.
However, the ﬁnal compromise did not give the House of Representatives
the initial power to appoint the president. It rejected the parliamentary
system, but the framers thought that what their compromise created was much
closer to the parliamentary system than one might expect from reading the
Constitution in light of the subsequent history. The framers—who in so many
ways were prescient—thought that in the typical situation no candidate could
muster a majority, so that the House would normally pick the president, with
each state having one vote. For example, George Mason, one of the framers,
thought the House of Representatives would elect the president 95 percent of
the time.
Why the compromise? Buckley examines this question using not only the
tools of history but also the tools of regression analysis. (He details, with great
care, his methods of analyzing the many convention votes on this issue, as well
as others, in three appendices included at the end of the book for those who
like to read the methodology and the tables.)
In seeking to understand why the delegates accepted a presidential
system, he examines a number of variables—delegates who were wealthier,
delegates who were slaveholders, delegates who had been oﬃcers during the
Revolutionary War (they were aristocratic and antidemocratic), delegates
from states with larger populations, and so forth.
First, he looked at wealth. The wealth of the delegates is relevant on some
issues, yet he warns, “[a]ny attempt to reduce the delegates’ motives solely to
economics is crude, and mistaken.”12 It turns out, upon examination of the
many votes of the method of choosing the chief executive, wealthy delegates
were 40 percent more likely to support a popularly elected president. One
might think that those with more wealth would be concerned that candidates
seeking the presidency would become rabble rousers in an eﬀort to win votes
and secure election. However, it appears they feared the people less than they
feared Congress.
The oﬃcer variable was virtually irrelevant and did not explain any of the
votes on presidential selection. One might think that this aristocratic class
would oppose a popular election (not trusting the masses, the vox populi). If so,
other factors were more important. An aristocrat like Alexander Hamilton, for
example, favored a strong chief executive because he was a nationalist.
It is common to say that the ﬁnal product of the debate on selecting the
president was a compromise between small states (which favored the House
appointing the president, with each state having one vote) and the larger,
more populated states. However, Buckley shows that this assertion does not
ﬁnd support in any of the votes cast. Small-state delegates stuck together
and favored the state legislatures appointing the senators but there was no
12.
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discernible evidence of a small-state coalition on the method of choosing the
president.
Our Constitution was conceived in original sin, and that sin was slavery.
Slave owners certainly were a voting bloc on some issues. After all, we would
expect them to support the clause that forbids Congress to outlaw the
importation of slaves prior to 1808.13 However, slave ownership does nothing
to explain the voting behavior of delegates on the method of selecting the
president.
In general, delegates who were more nationalistic and wealthier preferred
a strong presidential system, while less wealthy delegates (who also favored
states’ rights) supported a quasi-parliamentary system (where Congress
appointed the president). The result, at the time, was a system by which the
state legislature picked the electors and the electors picked the president. The
result, now, is a strong president directly elected by the people.
Yes, there is the veneer of an Electoral College. Our Constitution still says
that the electors choose the president. However, all the states now provide
that the people, in the general election, choose the electors, who promise (in
some cases, state law requires a promise under oath) that they will vote for the
candidate to whom they are pledged. The faithless elector is an endangered
species. People do not even know the names of their electors, because the
ballots list just the presidential candidates. In the old days, the ballot listed the
electors with the notation “pledged to ___”. Now, even that formality is gone.
This result is also an option that none of the framers embraced: one person,
both head of state and head of the government, elected by the people, with all
the modern powers—a very powerful president whom Congress ﬁnds diﬃcult
to check.
Buckley’s statistical analysis is signiﬁcant and an important contribution
to the literature. However, it would be misleading to think his book merely
crunches numbers and wades through hundreds of votes. He also gives us a
very thorough and entertaining history of the drafting of our Constitution, the
Canadian Constitution, and the incremental changes in the largely unwritten
British Constitution.
His historical analysis is fascinating. It also is a fun read. Let us be blunt:
Reading about law is not often fun. Law review articles seldom read like a
Jacqueline Susann novel. Buckley’s book is diﬀerent. He has a snappy prose
and a delightful style.
Madison, one of our founders, wanted Congress to appoint the president.
He also wanted the House of Representatives to appoint the senators; he
wanted seats in the Senate allocated by population and a congressional veto
over state laws. He lost all of those votes. Still, Madison is now called the
Father of the Constitution. Buckley’s quotable response: “If he is the Father
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of the Constitution, however, this is one of those cases, not unknown in the
delivery rooms, where the child bears little resemblance to the father.”14
In a later chapter, he explains how Madison would have preferred the
Canadian Constitution. One of the framers of the Canadian Constitution was
John A. Macdonald, who carefully read Madison’s notes on the Philadelphia
Convention. In fact, he brought a copy of them to the Quebec conference that
created Canada’s Constitution. (Later, when a woman asked Macdonald why
the Constitution did not extend the franchise to females, he said, “Madam, I
cannot conceive.”15)
Buckley compares the U.S. Constitution as the framers thought it would
work with the Constitution of today. The Constitution provides that Congress
proposes legislation and the president vetoes. In modern times, it is the
president who proposes legislation while Congress “vetoes” (by not enacting
it). Even when the opposition party controls both houses of Congress, the
president’s bill is always introduced and Congress conducts hearings and
considers it even if it does not enact it.
When Congress passes legislation that the president does not like, the
president can veto legislation. Admittedly, Congress can override, but the
supermajority requirement of a two-thirds vote in each House makes that hard.
Moreover, in modern times, the president is more likely to sign the
legislation and, in a signing statement, explain the decision not to comply
with various provisions. Congress can override a veto but it cannot override a
signing statement, which becomes more powerful than a veto. Barack Obama,
as a senator, strongly objected to signing statements, while Barack Obama as
president uses them with vigor.16 Where you stand depends on where you sit.
The modern president now routinely decides to suspend a law. It is hornbook
law that the president can refuse to enforce a law (civil or criminal) with the
claim that it is unconstitutional. It is also a given that the president, as the
chief legal oﬃcer, can decide not to prosecute someone in the criminal courts.
What is new is that the president now claims to possess (and now exercises)
power to waive or suspend portions of laws that he insists are constitutional
but he would like to waive or suspend anyway.
For example, in 1996, President Clinton signed a major welfare overhaul
that requires some welfare recipients to work. Congress, concerned that a
future president would not enforce that requirement, stipulated in the law that
the “workfare” requirements are nonwaivable. President Obama suspended
14.
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the workfare requirement. The people who receive the ﬁnancial beneﬁt are in
no mood to complain, nor would they have standing to do so.
Congress, in enacting the Aﬀordable Care Act, scheduled various provisions
to go into eﬀect in 2014. The law delegates much authority to the executive
branch, but there is no authority to waive these provisions. Nonetheless,
the president waived them until 2015 simply by announcing that he was not
going to enforce the penalties that the law provided. President Obama or his
appointees have granted over 1,000 waivers.17 We know that nearly 25 percent
of the waivers went to labor unions that supported the Aﬀordable Care Act.18
The power to suspend laws is a power to help one’s friends and hurt one’s
enemies. Many in Congress, including members of the president’s own party,
objected to the president’s power to waive the law.19 He did it anyway. Thus
far, federal courts have rejected on standing grounds anyone who complains
above the waiver.
As the president has increased his power over the past several decades,
Congress has been complicit. It routinely enacts laws broadly delegating
power to the president or his appointees, with the instructions to make
regulations having the force of law. The only restriction is that the regulations
should promote “public convenience and necessity,”20 or should prevent
“unfair methods of competition.”21 Or the secretary of Agriculture should
set prices that he or she “deems to be in the public interest and feasible in
view of the current consumptive demand.”22 The regulators are not members
of Congress but unelected bureaucrats. These presidential appointees never
come before the voters. They issue their rules without the cumbersome and
irksome congressional procedure, which the framers imposed to protect our
rights. The fact that we already live in a highly regulated world serves to
magnify their power.
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The president also issues executive orders that look like legislation but need
no congressional input. Buckley quotes Democratic presidential adviser Paul
Begala: “Stroke of the pen. Law of the Land. Kinda cool.”23 Yes, it is.
For example, President Obama recently issued several executive orders that
overhaul immigration. He justiﬁes these orders as part of his “prosecutorial
discretion.” However, his orders do not relate to criminal prosecutions. He
does not claim that the governing laws are unconstitutional. Instead, he says
that because Congress has not changed the law, he “changed the law.”24
These lengthy orders look like legislation. They are pages long, with
sections, subsections, provisos and eﬀective dates. I favor immigration reform
(both my parents came from the old country), and I hope that Congress will
do that. Nonetheless, it never occurred to me that the president, on his own,
could order federal employees to issue several million Social Security cards to
undocumented aliens—particularly when a host of opinions from the Oﬃce of
Legal Counsel and the Department of Justice say explicitly that the president
has no power to “suspend” law. The president and the Department of Justice
ignored these earlier opinions.25 (Apparently, it never occurred to the president
or the Department of Justice either, until November of 2014. Before that, the
president iterated and reiterated26 that he had no executive power to change
the immigration laws.27)
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Is the road to crown government irreversible, or can we at least backtrack
a bit? Buckley oﬀers several ideas, some of which are not going to happen.
We are unlikely to change our Constitution, just as we are unlikely to make
impeachments easier.28 However, Congress can delegate legislation with
standards much more speciﬁc than “public convenience and necessity.”
Courts could be more serious in requiring a delegation standard that is not so
open-ended. Nothing prevents the president from regularly appearing before
Congress to answer questions, as the prime minister does. Buckley quotes
British political scientist Harold Laski, who said, “No better method has ever
been devised for keeping administration up to the mark.”
Whether or not the road is irreversible, it will be an enjoyable journey to
know of its past, its present, and its possible future by reading The Once and
Future King: The Rise of Crown Government in America.
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